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The last two recessions in the U.S., starting in 2001 and 2007, were preceded by rapid increases followed by
abrupt collapses in some asset prices. These events have suggested to many observers, and reinforced the
beliefs of others, that asset prices can rise above levels justi￿ed by fundamentals, and that price corrections
can trigger or amplify ￿ uctuations with dramatic consequences for the macroeconomy. Moreover, indepen-
dent of the desire to understand recent crises, as a matter of theory one should want to know when and how
economic models can generate this type of equilibrium asset price behavior ￿increases above fundamental
values followed by collapses, or more generally, various types of complicated dynamics. This is a nontrivial
issue, in the sense that generating such asset price dynamics is not easy in standard models.
We take the view that asset markets are better understood in the context of economies where, because of
certain frictions, assets have a role in facilitating exchange. One version of this view is the claim that ￿nance
has something to learn from monetary theory, which is suggested (to us) by Kiyotaki and Moore (2005), Du¢ e
et al. (2005,2008), and many of the other papers surveyed in Nosal and Rocheteau (2010) or Williamson
and Wright (2010). We ￿nd this approach sensible because in monetary theory assets are valued not only
for their rates of return, or dividends, but also for their liquidity services. As a result, price trajectories that
seem anomalous from the perspective of standard asset pricing theory might emerge naturally in models
with trading frictions like those studied in monetary economics. The most obvious example is that monetary
models have equilibria with valued ￿at currency, which is an asset with 0 dividend, or no fundamental value,
and therefore one that should have a 0 price according to standard ￿nance. In monetary economics, currency
is valued for its liquidity. Our position is that liquidity considerations can potentially a⁄ect the price of any
asset, especially as the distinction has blurred between monetary and non-monetary assets, and hence we
propose a model where assets play a transactions role.1
1Some people, including Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2008), argue that certain assets have ￿convenience yields￿
￿ a loose term that might capture liquidity considerations. Our goal is to be more explicit about the transactions role of
assets. The general idea has been discussed before. Cochrane (2002) e.g. describes the tech-stock bubble of the late 90￿ s as ￿a
mechanism much like the transactions demand for money [that] drove many stock prices above the ￿ fundamental value￿they
would have had in a frictionless market.￿Regarding the 2007-08 recession, Reinhart and Rogo⁄ (2009) argue that securitization
allowed consumers ￿to turn their previously illiquid housing assets into ATM machines.￿Ferguson (2008) also says it ￿allowed
borrowers to treat their homes as cash machines,￿ and reports that between 1997 and 2006, ￿US consumers withdrew an
estimated $9 trillion in cash from the equity in their homes.￿ Greenspan and Kennedy (2007) say home equity withdrawal
￿nanced about 3% of personal consumption from 2001 to 2005. Again, our goal is to model these phenomena more explicitly.
1Figure 1: Sample price trajectory
While, as we show, the model can generate various, qualitatively di⁄erent, outcomes, an example of
what we think of as an interesting equilibrium asset price trajectory is depicted in Figure 1. It has two
noteable features. First, asset prices ￿ uctuate even though fundamentals (preferences, technologies and
government policies) are deterministic and time invariant, and agents are fully rational. Second, the price
ultimately crashes, which would typically be interpreted as a bubble bursting.2 This type of asset price
behavior can emerge easily in models that incorporate the frictions common in monetary economies, and can
be interpreted as a liquidity premium that ￿ uctuates over time. The potential importance of time-varying
liquidity is discussed by Acharya and Pedersen (2005), who present an overlapping generations model of
asset pricing where the illiquidity cost of an asset is exogenous. Here the liquidity premium emerges, and
varies, endogenously over time as a self-ful￿lling prophecy. This can happen because liquidity is at least in
part a matter of beliefs. As any monetary economist knows, what agents are ready to accept in exchange
can depend critically on what they think others readily accept. Kiyotaki and Wright (1989,1993) formalize
this idea in a model of decentralized trade. But since that setup is crude on several dimensions (e.g. it has
indivisible goods and assets), we instead build on the extension of the framework developed in Lagos and
Wright (2005) and Rocheteau and Wright (2005).
2We do not claim to propose, nor we did not try to ￿nd in the literature, a de￿nitive de￿nition of a bubble (but see the
discussion in LeRoy 2004). To avoid purely semantic disagreement, for our purposes, a bubble is de￿ned as an equilibrium
outcome where the price of some asset is di⁄erent from its fundamental price, where the fundamental price is the present value
of its dividend stream.
2In this model, agents trade periodically in both centralized and decentralized markets. The centralized
markets are there mainly for technical convenience, as they help reduce the complexity of the state space.
Much of the interesting action occurs in decentralized markets, characterized by bilateral matching and
bargaining. There are gains from trade in these bilateral meetings, but this is hindered by a standard double-
coincidence problem: a potential buyer cannot simply produce something in the match that a potential seller
wants, ruling out barter. Also, because of imperfect commitment, enforcement and record keeping, in at least
some matches, unsecured credit is not viable, because borrowers can renege with impunity. When unsecured
credit is not available, assets have a role in transactions. There are two interpretations: (1) buyers directly
give assets to sellers in the meetings; (2) buyers use assets to collateralize loans, to be repaid later, say in
the next centralized market (which is convenient because in frictionless markets we can assume without loss
of generality loans are repaid in numØraire goods). In case (1) there is ￿nality when the assets are handed
over. In case (2) there is delayed settlement, and a seller gets the assets if and only if a buyer reneges on
an obligation. Aside from this detail, for our purposes (1) and (2) are equivalent. Also, although we often
interpret transactions as payments or collateralized debt by consumers, one can equivalently interpret the
model as having producer transactions or collateralized debt (see Section 7.3).
As a special case, we study an economy where credit works perfectly, say because there is perfect commit-
ment/enforcement. In this economy, liquidity plays no role: buyers do not need to transfer assets to sellers
or use them as collateral, since loan repayment is guaranteed by assumption. We prove in this case that
assets must be priced fundamentally. When credit is imperfect, however, liquid assets are essential, and more
interesting outcomes are possible. In our baseline model, the assets with a liquidity role are assumed to be
in ￿xed supply, just like the claims to trees that give o⁄ fruit as dividends in the Lucas (1978) asset-pricing
model. We are agnostic about the exact nature of assets, however, and they can alternatively be interpreted
as representing land and/or housing. However one likes to think about the asset, we will assume that is
has certain properties, including the fact that it is easily recognizable, that make it acceptable as means of
payment or collateral. There can also be other assets in the model that are less liquid, and cannot be used
in this way, for reasons discussed below. This allows us to talk about a premium on liquid assets.
3An additional important ingredient in the model is the decision of potential sellers to participate in
decentralized trade. This allows us to endogenize the frequency of trading opportunities, and hence the
need for liquidity, which can generate multiple stationary equilibria and dynamic equilibria where asset
prices follow paths that look like bubbles. The mechanism works in part through complementarities between
buyers￿asset holdings and sellers￿participation decisions. When there are many sellers, it is a buyers￿market,
and hence buyers want to hold more liquid assets. This drives up asset prices, which gives sellers a greater
incentives to participate. These complementarities can deliver multiple stationary equilibria, across which
asset prices, output, stock market capitalization and welfare are positively related. An additional mechanism
works through the intertemporal relationship between asset prices and liquidity. In equilibria where asset
prices ￿ uctuate, the liquidity premium depends negatively on the total value of liquid wealth, because a
marginal asset is more useful in transactions when liquidity is scarce. Thus, in a boom, asset prices are high
because agents anticipate they will be low and liquidity more valuable in the future when wealth falls.
The results about multiple stationary equilibria and dynamic equilibria with ￿ uctuating or bubble-like
asset prices depend on a positive liquidity premium, which depends on the supply of liquidity being scarce:
such equilibria do not exist when supply satiates the demand for liquidity. The idea that the available supply
of liquid assets is relatively scarce is arguably empirically relevant. For instance, Caballero (2006) champions
the view that the world has a shortage of ￿nancial assets, and suggests that the recurrent emergence of
speculative bubbles is easier to understand once one acknowledges this. In terms of the needs for liquid
assets, Geanakoplos and Zame (2010) document that ￿the total [value] of collateralized lending is enormous:
the value of U.S. residential mortgages alone exceeds $9.7 trillion (only slightly less than the $10.15 trillion
total capitalization of S&P 500 ￿rms).￿So we think it is plausible to consider the case where demand is
not satiated by the supply of liquid assets. In this case, the theory can be used to analyze the interaction
between public and private liquidity.
Consider a situation where ￿rms can be created by issuing equity that, like the Lucas trees, serves to
satisfy transactions needs. A shortage of liquidity generates a decrease in the real interest rate, which provides
an incentive to create new ￿rms, and the new shares provide additional liquidity. Hence, in principle, the
4market can generate its own liquidity. But perhaps not enough, in which case we can consider the public
provision of liquidity, say the issuance of government bonds that also satisfy transactions needs. In our
benchmark model, if government policy provides enough of these assets to satiate demand, we eliminate
any liquidity premia and get a unique equilibrium where assets are priced fundamentally. Because of the
nature of decentralized trade, however, this policy may not implement a constrained-e¢ cient allocation. In
one variant of the model, we show that if the government provides enough liquidity to satiate demand the
economy may be characterized by excess participation in decentralized trade, in which case it is better from
a welfare perspective to keep liquidity scarce.
While many of these results are novel, there is much related work. There is a large literature on pricing
currency, as well as assets more generally, in overlapping generations economies, including Wallace (1980),
Grandmont (1985), Tirole (1985) and Santos and Woodford (1997); see Azariadis (1993) for a textbook
treatment. In contrast to the outcomes that can emerge in overlapping generations models, here the bubble-
like component of an asset price is best interpreted as a liquidity premium. And, again in contrast to those
models, this liquidity premium does not grow forever at the rate of interest. In our formulation, assets prices
can increase above fundamental values, and liquidity premia can grow at the rate of interest for a while, but
ultimately they collapse. An important di⁄erence between our in￿nitely-lived agent model and models with
overlapping generations of ￿nitely-lived agents is that we have to take the relevant transversality condition
into account. LeRoy (2004) surveys the literature on bubbles more generally, some of which is based on
irrationality or otherwise complicated belief structures.3 By contrast, we can generate equilibria where asset
prices rise and markets crash in bubble-like fashion in deterministic perfect foresight equilibrium, with no
appeal to irrationality or complicated beliefs.
A somewhat related literature, including Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), Kiyotaki (1998), Kocherlakota
(2000,2009), Ferraris and Watanabe (2008), and Mills and Reed (2009), discusses economies with assets
playing dual roles as factors of production and collateral. Also related is work by Geanakopolos and Zame
3We cannot discuss it all here, but by way of example, consider Abreu and Brunnermeier (2003). There bubbles occur
because irrationally exuberant behavioral traders believe that asset prices will grow at a rate higher than the risk-free rate in
perpetuity. Rational arbitrageurs sequentially become aware that the price has departed from fundamentals, and the bubble
can burst only if there is a su¢ cient mass of arbitrageurs who have sold out. See also Allen and Gorton (1993) or Allen, Morris
and Postlewaite (1993) for di⁄erent but related models.
5(2010), who construct a two-period general equilibrium model with durable goods and collateral. Some of
these models are designed to argue that the interaction between credit limits and asset prices is a powerful
propagation mechanism (see Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrisht 1999 for a survey of earlier models in a similar
spirit). In contrast to those models, the balance sheets of ￿rms play no role for the dynamics of asset
prices in this paper: our ￿rms face no borrowing constraints, and can ￿nance investment at the rate of
time preference. Similarly, our households can supply labor unconstrained to ￿nance consumption and asset
purchases. Instead, our results derive from the focus on liquidity ￿one could say from the moneyness of some
assets ￿and instead of illustrating the propagation or ampli￿cation of exogenous shocks to fundamentals,
our goal is to generate interesting dynamics entirely from the endogenous liquidity premium.
Other models of bubbles include Allen and Gale (2000) and Barlevy (2009), who emphasize agency
problems. Farhi and Tirole (2010), in particular, consider an overlapping generations version of the corporate
￿nance model in Holmstrom and Tirole (2008), where agency problems prevent ￿rms from borrowing against
future output. They show that bubbles are more likely when the supply of outside liquidity is scarce and
corporate income is less pledgeable. Some of these results are consistent with what we ￿nd here, even
thought the model is quite di⁄erent, such as the fact that interesting dynamics are more likely to emerge
when liquidity is scarce, and that there is an amount of outside liquidity that eliminates these equilibria;
we think we deliver much richer asset price dynamics, and we like our emphasis on the relationship between
asset prices, liquidity and trading frictions. This emphasis is common in New Monetarist Economics, as
surveyed in Williamson and Wright (2010) and Nosal and Rocheteau (2010).4
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the environment. Section 3 analyzes the case where
credit works perfectly. Sections 4, 5 and 6 have imperfect credit, so liquid assets are essential, and study
stationary, non-stationary, and stochastic (sunspot) equilibria. Section 7 discusses endogenous private and
public liquidity, and an application of the model to corporate ￿nance. Section 8 concludes.
4Papers in that literature concerned with liquidity and asset pricing includes Lagos (2007), Geromichalos, Licari and Suarez-
Lledo (2007), Lagos and Rocheteau (2008), Lester, Postlewaite and Wright (2008), Rocheteau (2008), Li and Rocheteau (2009),
Li and Li (2010). Those papers do not consider nonstationary equilibria, however, and do not endogenize market participation.
Lagos and Wright (2003) do study nonstationary equilibria, but do not endogenize participation, and money is the only asset.
Lagos and Rocheteau (2009) analyze (dealers￿ ) participation decisions but only look at steady states. Rocheteau and Wright
(2005) model seller participation, but also consider only stationary equilibria, and money is the only asset. Guerrieri and
Lorenzoni (2009) establish a link between liquidity and volatility, but their mechanism is di⁄erent.
62 The Environment
Following Rocheteau and Wright (2005), the set of agents consists of a [0;1] continuum of households and
an [0;S] continuum of ￿rms. In each period of discrete time, they engage in two types of activity: in one
subperiod they trade in a decentralized market, or DM, characterized by frictions detailed below; in another
subperiod they trade in a frictionless centralized market, or CM. There are two nonstorable consumption
goods: xt is produced and consumed in the CM; yt is is produced and consumed in the DM. Households can









where ￿ 2 (0;1).5 For simplicity, let U(yt;xt;ht) = u(yt) + U(xt) ￿ ht, where u(yt) and U(xt) are twice
continuously di⁄erentiable, strictly increasing, and concave. Moreover, u(0) = 0, u0(0) = 1. Let y￿ solve
u0(y￿) = c0(y￿) and let x￿ solve U0(x￿) = 1. To reduce notation, normalize U(x￿) ￿ x￿ = 0.
As is standard in search theory (e.g. Pissarides 2000), we model ￿rm entry as follows. To participate
in the DM at t, ￿rms must invest kf > 0 units of the CM good at t ￿ 1. This allows it to generate at t
any amount y 2 [0;1] of the DM good, plus x = f(1 ￿ y) of the CM good, where f is twice continuously
di⁄erentiable, strictly increasing and concave, f0(0) = 1, and f0(1) = 0. This makes c(y) ￿ f(1) ￿ f(1 ￿ y)
the opportunity cost of selling y in the DM, where c(0) = 0, c0(0) = 0, and c0(1) = 1. Assume kf > ￿f(1),
so it is not pro￿table to produce only CM goods. One can think of ￿rms as issuing equity to pay for the
investment kf: each share issued in the CM at t￿1 at a normalized price of 1 entitles its holder to a fraction
1=kf of pro￿t at t. Assume portfolios of households are fully diversi￿ed, and denote by Rt the expected
return. In addition to equity in these ￿rms, there is another asset, in ￿xed supply A > 0, that one can think
of as a standard Lucas tree, or maybe a house, yielding ￿ > 0 units of x (our numØraire) each period in the
CM. Let q be the CM price of this asset in terms of x.
The DM involves bilateral random matching. The matching probabilities for households and ￿rms are
￿(n) and ￿(n)=n, respectively, where n is the measure of participating ￿rms. As is standard, ￿0(n) > 0,
5We assume in the text the limit in (1) exists; in case it does not, Appendix B uses the catching-up criterion for optimization
discussed in Brock (1970) and Seierstad and Sydsaeter (1987).
7￿00(n) < 0, ￿(n) ￿ minf1;ng, ￿(0) = 0, ￿0(0) = 1 and ￿(1) = 1. One can make di⁄erent assumptions
concerning the possibility of credit in the DM. At one extreme is full commitment or enforcement. In
this case, in any DM meeting, households can credibly promise a ￿rm payment in the next CM. At the
other extreme is no commitment. Together with the assumption that agents are anonymous ￿so that we
cannot punish those who renege on debts, say because there is no monitoring or record keeping that permits
identi￿cation after the fact ￿this rules out unsecured credit (the surveys mentioned in the Introduction
provide discussion and references). In this case, DM trade is either quid pro quo, or equivalently, for our
purposes, collateralized debt.6
To guarantee that equity shares in ￿rms cannot be used for the same purpose as claims to trees, we assume
they can be costlessly counterfeited and cannot be authenticated in the DM. By contrast, claims to trees can
be authenticated or cannot be counterfeited, so they can be used as a means of payment or collateral. This
distinction operationalizes the di⁄erence between liquid and illiquid assets, in the benchmark model, but we
consider below the case where ￿rms and trees are treated symmetrically. The idea of modeling di⁄erential
liquidity in terms of information frictions, or recognizability, has been used recently in Lester, Postlewaite,
and Wright (2008), Rocheteau (2008), Li and Rocheteau (2009), and much earlier work cited therein. In
those models, the possibility of counterfeiting an asset at cost leads to equilibria with an endogenous upper
bound ￿ ￿ on the amount that can be used in DM trade. As the cost of counterfeiting vanishes, ￿ ￿ ! 0 and the
asset is not used in the DM at all. We attribute this information problem to equity in ￿rms but not trees
because we want the stock of liquid assets to be ￿xed; later, we assume all assets are equally recognizable.
3 Perfect Credit
As a benchmark, suppose households can commit to repay DM debt. Let Wt(a;s;d) be a household￿ s value
function in the CM at t with a units of the liquid asset, s illiquid shares in ￿rms, and debt d from the
6The above-mentioned equivalence is nicely described by David Andofatto in a recent blog: ￿On the surface, these two
methods of payment [assets used for payment or used to collateralize debt] look rather di⁄erent. The ￿rst entails immediate
settlement, while the second entails delayed settlement. To the extent that the asset in question circulates widely as a device
used for immediate settlement, it is called money (in this case, backed money). To the extent it is used in support of debt,
it is called collateral. But while the monetary and credit transactions just described look di⁄erent on the surface, they are
equivalent in the sense that capital is used to facilitate transactions that might not otherwise have taken place.￿
8previous DM, in units of x. Similarly, let Vt(a;s) be their value function in the DM at t. Then we have
Wt(at;st;dt) = max
xt;ht;at+1;st+1
fU (xt) ￿ ht + ￿Vt+1 (at+1;st+1)g (2)
st xt + dt + qt(at+1 ￿ at) + st+1 = ht + ￿at + Rtst; (3)
where qt is the price of the liquid asset and Rt the gross return on shares. In Appendix B we show that
a solution to the recursive problem solves the underlying sequence problem as long as the transversality
condition limt!1 ￿
tqtat+1 = 0 holds. Assuming x￿ is large, ht ￿ 0 never binds, and we can substitute ht
from (3) into (2) to obtain





f￿qtat+1 ￿ st+1 + ￿Vt+1 (at+1;st+1)g: (4)
Notice (4) immediately implies (at+1;st+1) is independent of (at;st;dt), which means we do not have to
track the distribution of assets across agents in the DM as a state variable. This is the simpli￿cation implied
by introducing some centralized trade into an otherwise standard search model.7
Lemma 1 xt = x￿; Wt is linear in wealth (qt + ￿)at + Rtst ￿ dt; and (at+1;st+1) is independent of wealth.
Moving to the DM, in any meeting the ￿rm gives the household output y, in exchange for ￿a liquid assets,
￿s stocks, and a promise (debt) of d payable in the next CM. To determine the terms of trade, for now, we
use Kalai￿ s (1977) proportional bargaining solution with ￿ 2 [0;1] denoting the household￿ s share:
(yt;￿a;t;￿s;t;dt) = arg max
y;￿a;￿s;d
[u(y) + Wt(a ￿ ￿a;s ￿ ￿s;d) ￿ Wt(a;s;0)] (5)
st u(y) + Wt(a ￿ ￿a;s ￿ ￿s;d) ￿ Wt(a;s;0) =
￿
1 ￿ ￿
[f(1 ￿ y) + (qt + ￿)￿a + Rt￿s + d ￿ f(1)] (6)
(Note that we add some constraints on asset transfers in the next paragraph.) Intuitively, the proportional
solution is pairwise e¢ cient and gives the traders surpluses in ￿xed proportions, where the surplus is the
di⁄erence between the payo⁄ if they trade and if they do not trade. We use this to reduce the algebra,
but the main results survive under generalized Nash bargaining or Walrasian pricing ￿indeed, with perfect
7We also need quasi-linear utility in the CM for this to work. See the surveys mentioned in the Introduction for references
to (much more complicated) search-based monetary models without a CM or without quasi-linearity.
9credit the solutions are equivalent, but with imperfect credit the proportional solution has some advantages
discussed in Footnote 8). Figure 2 provides a stylized representation of the solution, where UH and UF are
the surpluses and the frontier solves UH + UF = u(y￿) ￿ c(y￿).
It is important to include the following constraints on asset transfers to the bargaining problem: ￿a ￿ a,
and ￿s ￿ min(s;￿ ￿s), where generally ￿ ￿s is an upper bound that arises because of the recognizability problem
discussed above ￿ e.g. if stocks are freely counterfeitable and not veri￿able then ￿ ￿s = 0. With these
constraints, using the linearity of Wt and c(y) = f(1) ￿ f(1 ￿ y), the bargaining solution becomes
(yt;￿a;t;￿s;t;dt) = arg max
y;￿a;￿s;d
[u(y) ￿ (qt + ￿)￿a ￿ Rt￿s ￿ d] (7)
st (qt + ￿)￿a + Rt￿s + d = (1 ￿ ￿)u(y) + ￿c(y) (8)
￿a ￿ a; ￿s ￿ min(s;￿ ￿s): (9)
It is immediate that yt = y￿ and (qt + ￿)￿a;t + Rt￿s;t + dt = (1 ￿ ￿)u(y￿) + ￿c(y￿). Thus, we get e¢ cient
production yt = y￿ in every DM meeting, just like we earlier found xt = x￿ in the CM. Moreover, the
exact form of payment ￿in terms of ￿a;t, ￿s;t or dt ￿is irrelevant as long as the total payment has CM
value (1 ￿ ￿)u(y￿) + ￿c(y￿). Hence, we can impose without loss of generality that DM trade is conducted
exclusively with debt, and the liquidity or illiquidity of assets is irrelevant for consumption or welfare.
Now consider asset pricing. Given the linearity of Wt and the bargaining solution,
Vt(a;s) = ￿(nt)[u(y￿) + Wt (a;s;d)] + [1 ￿ ￿(nt)]Wt(a;s;0)
= ￿(nt)￿[u(y￿) ￿ c(y￿)] + (qt + ￿)a + Rts + Wt(0;0;0): (10)
Substituting (10) into (4), the choice of assets in period t ￿ 1 solves
max
a￿0;s￿0




￿1 or Rt > ￿
￿1, there is no solution to the problem. If
qt+￿
qt￿1 ￿ ￿
￿1 or Rt ￿ ￿
￿1, the
solution satis￿es [qt￿1 ￿ ￿(qt + ￿)]a = 0 and [1 ￿ ￿Rt]s = 0. Market clearing implies that for illiquid equity
Rt = ￿
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Figure 2: Proportional bargaining: Perfect credit
Given nonnegativity qt ￿ 0, together with the transversality condition limt!1 ￿
tqt = 0, the only admissible
solution to this di⁄erence equation is qt = q￿, where by de￿nition q￿ ￿ ￿
r is the fundamental price.











In words, with probability ￿(nt)=nt, the ￿rm meets a household in the DM and sells y￿ for a promise of
dt = (1 ￿ ￿)u(y￿) + ￿c(y￿) in the next CM, and then sells f(1 ￿ yt) in the CM. And with complementary
probability 1 ￿
￿(nt)




(1 ￿ ￿)[u(y￿) ￿ c(y￿)] + f(1): (13)
Firms participate in the DM as long as ￿t ￿ Rtkf. Using ￿Rt = 1, the measure of entrants nt solves
￿(nt)
nt
(1 ￿ ￿)[u(y￿) ￿ c(y￿)] ￿ k; = if nt > 0; (14)
where k ￿ k
f
￿ ￿ f(1) is the e⁄ective entry cost.
This leads to the following de￿nition and results.
11De￿nition 1 An equilibrium with perfect credit is a nonnegative sequence f(qt;nt)g
1
t=0 solving (11) and
(14), with limt!1 ￿
tqt = 0. All other variables, including xt, Rt etc. are determined as discussed above.
Proposition 1 Equilibrium with perfect credit exists, is unique and is stationary.
These result follow from the observation that, for all t, qt = q￿, and there is a unique nt = n solving
(14). Also, xt = x￿ and yt = y￿. Hence, with perfect credit, asset prices are constant at their fundamental
values, and consumption is constant at its e¢ cient level. Overall e¢ ciency, however, also requires n = n￿,
which holds i⁄ a standard Hosios (1990) condition holds, equating ￿rms￿share of the DM surplus to the
elasticity of the matching function. For an arbitrary ￿, even with perfect credit, equilibrium is not generally
e¢ cient, and entry could be too high or too low due to ￿rms not internalizing their impact on the matching
probabilities of other ￿rms and households.
Proposition 2 With perfect credit the equilibrium is e¢ cient i⁄




where n￿ solves ￿0(n)[u(y￿) ￿ c(y￿)] = k.
4 Imperfect Credit
We now describe the economy where households cannot commit to repay debt, which means dt = 0. In
this economy, the liquidity of assets can be critical. We continue to assume for now that shares in ￿rms
are not recognizable, so ￿ ￿s = 0. In fact, it is straightforward to allow credit in some meetings, but not
others, and all results go through exactly as stated provided we reinterpret ￿ as the probability of a no-
credit meeting. Similarly, we can assume shares in ￿rms are recognizable in some meetings, but not others,
or make counterfeiting costly and use the endogenous upper bound ￿ ￿s > 0 derived in Rocheteau (2008) or
Li and Rocheteau (2009) (recall that ￿ ￿s = 0 when counterfeiting is costless). Given this is understood, we
proceed here with dt = ￿ ￿s = 0 in all DM meetings. The CM value function of the household is still given by
(2)-(3), but since credit is not feasible we omit the third argument of Wt.
12Proportional solution
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Figure 3: Proportional bargaining solution: Imperfect credit
Although we show in the Appendix the main results are preserved using Nash bargaining, we continue
here to use proportional bargaining in the DM.8 See Figure 3, where the frontier of the bargaining set is
UH +UF = u(y￿)￿c(y￿) if (qt+￿)a ￿ c(y￿)+UF, and UH = u￿c￿1 ￿
(qt + ￿)a ￿ UF￿
￿(qt+￿)a otherwise.
As compared to the previous section, the frontier is now linear when y = y￿ and strictly concave when
y < y￿.9 The constraints on the bargaining problem are ￿a ￿ a, and ￿s ￿ min(s;￿ ￿s). The solution is given
by (5)-(6) with dt = 0 and ￿s;t = 0. Substituting (qt + ￿)￿a from (8) into (7), this simpli￿es to
yt = argmax
y
￿[u(y) ￿ c(y)] (15)
st ￿a;t =
(1 ￿ ￿)u(y) + ￿c(y)
qt + ￿
￿ a: (16)




qt+￿ . If it does bind, then yt is the solution to
8This has several desirable features when credit is infeasible. First, it guarantees the function V is concave. Second, the
proportional solution is monotonic (each player￿ s surplus increases with the total surplus), which means households have no
incentive to hide some assets. These results cannot be guaranteed with Nash bargaining (Aruoba, Rocheteau and Waller 2007).
Also, while Nash is attractive, due to its strategic foundations, in stationary models (see e.g. Osborne and Rubinstein 1990),
this does not generally apply in nonstationary environments (Coles and Wright 1998; Ennis 2001).
9Readers may see an analogy between models with perfect or imperfect credit, on the one hand, and models with transferable
or nontransferable utility, on the other. It is known models with nontransferable utility can generate more complicated equilibria
than those with transferable utility (e.g. Burdett and Wright 1998).
13(qt + ￿)a = !(yt), where
!(yt) ￿ ￿c(yt) + (1 ￿ ￿)u(yt): (17)
The important point here is that yt is a function of a household￿ s liquid wealth. More generally, there
is nothing particularly special about households in this regard, and there is no reason one cannot interpret
our results as applying to trades between two ￿rms, say, instead of a household and a ￿rm. Payment by the
transfer of assets by a consumer, or equivalently the use of assets to collateralize consumer debt, is not that
di⁄erent from the transfer of assets by a producer or the use of collateralized debt by a producer who wants
to expand his capital stock or acquire any other input. While, of course, the economic interpretation may
be di⁄erent, the analytic results are identical. We think this is interesting because there is much emphasis
in the related literature on collateral or corporate ￿nance more generally (see e.g. Kiyotaki and More 2005,
Holmstrom and Tirole 2008, or Farhi and Tirole 2010). We can capture not only what they have in mind,
but we think more, with a simple reinterpretation of our model. In particular, we think it would be nice
if that literature described in more detail the ways agents make transactions with each other ￿as opposed
to transacting ￿with the market￿￿as we try to do here. In Section 7 we sketch the details of a corporate
￿nance explicitly, but to ease the presentation, for now, we continue focusing on household liquidity.
In any case, following the reasoning in Section 3, we have
Vt(a;s) = ￿(nt)￿fu[y((qt + ￿)a)] ￿ c[y((qt + ￿)a)]g + (qt + ￿)a + Rts + Wt(0;0): (18)
By substituting Vt(a;s) from (18) into (4), the household￿ s choice of assets at t ￿ 1 solves
max
a￿0
f￿qt￿1a + ￿￿(nt)￿(u[y((qt + ￿)a)] ￿ c[y((qt + ￿)a)]) + ￿(qt + ￿)ag + max
s￿0
(￿1 + ￿Rt)s:
As above, illiquid stocks are held only if ￿Rt = 1. The choice of liquid assets can be expressed
max
a￿0




r is the fundamental price. The household chooses liquid assets to maximize the expected
DM surplus minus the cost of holding the asset, where the cost is the capitalized di⁄erence between the price
of the asset and its fundamental value, r(qt￿1 ￿ q￿), net of the capital gain qt ￿ qt￿1.
14It is immediate that the problem has a solution only if r(qt￿1 ￿ q￿) ￿ qt ￿ qt￿1. We also have the
following results. (All proofs are in the Appendix.)






tqtat+1 = 0 (20)
and, for all t ￿ 1, the following is true:
(i) If r(qt￿1 ￿ q￿) > qt ￿ qt￿1, at is the unique solution to
￿(r(qt￿1 ￿ q￿) ￿ (qt ￿ qt￿1)) + ￿(nt)￿
￿
u0(y) ￿ c0(y)
￿c0(y) + (1 ￿ ￿)u0(y)
￿
(qt + ￿) ￿ 0; = if at > 0; (21)
where y = y((qt + ￿)at).








Summing the transversality condition (20) across agents, market clearing implies limt!1 ￿
tqtA = 0,
where A is the ￿xed supply of the asset. Hence, limt!1 ￿
tqt = 0, which means that the asset price must
asymptotically grow slower than the rate of time preference. From Lemma 2, if
qt+￿
qt￿1 < 1+r, the solution to
the problem is unique and the distribution of liquid assets across households in the DM is degenerate. And if
qt+￿
qt￿1 = 1+r, the household￿ s choice of at is not pinned down, but they all have at least enough liquid wealth
to buy y￿ in the DM. In this case, they are satiated in liquidity, and while the exact distribution of asset
holdings is not determinate, it is not especially relevant since agents are indi⁄erent to any asset position as
described in part (ii) of the Lemma.











which as in the previous section implies
￿(nt)
nt
(1 ￿ ￿)[u(yt) ￿ c(yt)] ￿ k; = if nt > 0: (23)
This is similar to (14), except we replace y￿ with yt when credit is imperfect.
15In the following we will restrict our attention to equilibria where all households hold the same level of
liquid assets, but from Lemma 2 this is without loss in generality.
De￿nition 2 An equilibrium with imperfect credit is a nonnegative sequence f(qt;nt)g
1
t=0 solving (21) and
(23) with limt!1 ￿
tqt = 0 and at = A and some initial condition n0. From these all other variables are
determined in the obvious way.
We start by characterizing stationary (steady-state) equilibria where (qt;nt) is constant, implying transver-
sality is automatically satis￿ed. Consider the stationary version of the participation condition (23), and let
n(q) denote the solution for n given q.
Lemma 3 Given q, n(q) > 0 i⁄
(1 ￿ ￿)fu[y((q + ￿)A)] ￿ c[y((q + ￿)A)]g > k: (24)
If (24) holds, then n0(q) > 0 if (q + ￿)A < !(y￿) and n0(q) = 0 if (q + ￿)A > !(y￿), where !(y) is de￿ned
in (17).
According to (24), ￿rms participate in the DM i⁄ their surplus, which is a fraction 1 ￿ ￿ of the total match
surplus, is greater than the cost k. Moreover, if the value of liquid assets (q + ￿)A is too small to allow
agents to trade y￿, an increase in the price q raises wealth and induces more ￿rms to participate. This is
the channel through which asset prices a⁄ect pro￿ts: higher prices increase the DM gains from trade, when
credit is imperfect, because households have more liquid wealth with which to transact or, equivalently, use
as collateral.
Consider next the stationary version of the asset-pricing condition (21), and let q(n) denote the solution
for q given n.
Lemma 4 (i) If (q￿+￿)A ￿ !(y￿), then q(n) = q￿; (ii) If (q￿+￿)A < !(y￿), then q(n) > q￿ for all n > 0,
q0(n) > 0, limn!0 q(n) = q￿, and limn!1 q(n) = q1 > q￿.
If aggregate liquidity is large enough for households to buy y￿ then q must be priced fundamentally; otherwise
it exhibits a liquidity component q(n) > q￿, which in our terminology is a bubble. If n increases, it is easier
16for households to trade, so demand for liquid assets rises, as does the liquidity premium or bubble. This is
the the channel through which ￿rms￿participation decisions a⁄ect asset prices.
To describe the set of stationary equilibria, de￿ne two thresholds for the participation cost:
k￿ = (1 ￿ ￿)[u(y￿) ￿ c(y￿)];
~ k = (1 ￿ ￿)fu[y [(q￿ + ￿)A]] ￿ c[y [(q￿ + ￿)A]]g:
The threshold k￿ corresponds to the maximum cost consistent with n > 0 when y = y￿, while ~ k is the
maximum cost consistent with n > 0 when q = q￿. Notice that ~ k ￿ k￿, with strict inequality if (q￿ + ￿)A <
!(y￿).
Proposition 3 (i) If (q￿ + ￿)A ￿ !(y￿) then there is a unique stationary equilibrium and it has q = q￿,





(1 ￿ ￿)[u(y￿) ￿ c(y￿)]
if k < k￿
n = 0 otherwise.




such that: if k < ~ k, then all stationary equilibria have




, then there is an inactive stationary equilibrium with (n;q) = (0;q￿) and an
even number of stationary equilibria with n > 0; if k > ^ k, then there is a unique stationary equilibrium and
it has n = 0 and q = q￿. Moreover, for all r < 2￿
￿￿00(0)(1￿￿), there is a ￿ A <
!(y
￿)
q￿+￿ such that for all A < ￿ A,
~ k < ^ k.
The outcome is depicted in Figure 4, in the case where liquidity is scarce in the sense that (q￿ + ￿)A <
!(y￿), for three values of k. Notice the origin in the ￿gure is not (0;0), but (0;q￿), since the fundamental price
q￿ is the relevant lower bound on q. Summarizing the economic content of these results, if there is enough
liquidity for households to buy y￿ in the DM, assets are priced fundamentally, as in the model with perfect
credit. But if liquid assets are in short supply, in any equilibrium with n > 0, the asset bears a premium,
q > q￿, and households trade less than the e¢ cient quantity, y < y￿. If k is too big, of course, the DM shuts
down and there is no transactions role for assets, so they are priced fundamentally, q = q￿. There can be
17multiple stationary equilibria, including an inactive one with n = 0 and q = q￿, and an even number of active
equilibria with n > 0 and q > q￿ (although we drew the two curves as convex and concave, all we really know
is they are both upward sloping). This multiplicity arises from the complementarities between households￿
portfolio choices and ￿rms￿entry decisions discussed above. One way to verify this is to consider a version
of the model with entry on the other side of the DM ￿a ￿xed number of ￿rms and endogenous participation
by households. In this version, the strategic complementarities between participation decisions and portfolio
choices are removed, and there is a unique stationary equilibrium (details available upon request).
* q
k k = k k < k k >




q￿+￿ and ~ k < ^ k.
Notice that the asset can be valued above its fundamental price only when n > 0. In other words, bubbles
are associated with increased economic activity. This may come as a surprise to some people, although it is
similar to the message in Kocherlakota (2009), or to the familiar idea in monetary economics that monetary
equilibria entail more trade than nonmonetary equilibria. The model also has predictions for the relationship
between the price of the liquid asset and the capitalization of the stock market, or the total value of the ￿rms,
n￿ = ￿(n)(1￿￿)[u(y) ￿ c(y)]+nf(1). From the above results, there is a positive relation between q, y, and
n across equilibria. So, the larger the price of the liquid asset, the larger is stock market capitalization. This
is in contrast with some models, where bubbles tends to reduce the capital stock (see e.g. the overlapping
18generations model in Tirole 1985 or the search model in Lagos and Rocheteau 2008).
The model also generates predictions concerning asset prices and trading volume, where trade volume in
the DM is the fraction of A used for transactions each period, V =
￿(n)￿a
A . This measure, which is obviously
similar to the notion of velocity in monetary economics, has been used by Wallace (1996,2000) to analyze
liquidity structure. Some observers, such as Cochrane (2002), claim that a positive relation between price
and volume is a generic feature of bubbles. In case of multiple equilibria, V and q are positively related
across equilibria. Of course, whenever there are multiple equilibria, comparative statics di⁄er across them,
so the following Proposition 4 focuses on the the best (see Proposition 5 below). In this equilibrium, if there
is no shortage of liquidity, q is independent of A and k, and trade volume decreases with k simply because
fewer ￿rms enter. When liquidity is scarce, however, q decreases with A as well as k, and changes in k induce
a positive relation between q and V.
Proposition 4 Consider the stationary equilibrium with the highest q. (i) If A ￿
!(y
￿)




@k = 0 and @V
@k < 0. (ii) If A <
!(y
￿)




@k < 0 and @V
@k < 0.






￿(n)fu(y) ￿ (q + ￿)￿ag + ￿A + rnkf￿
=
￿(n)￿[u(y) ￿ c(y)] + A￿ + rnkf
1 ￿ ￿
; (25)
which is the discounted sum of household￿ s expected DM surplus, plus the utility generated by the returns
on trees and stocks, the latter being equal (by free entry) to the number of ￿rms times the entry cost.








. Then, V is increasing with q across equilibria.
Equilibria where q is low are dominated by those with higher q. Indeed, welfare is minimized when assets
are priced fundamentally. Again, this may be a surprise to some people, but not to monetary economists.
Equilibria are not in general e¢ cient. In the perfect credit economy, e¢ ciency requires the Hosios (1990)
condition; now it requires this plus an adequate supply of liquid assets.
19Proposition 6 Equilibrium is e¢ cient i⁄
A ￿
￿c(y￿) + (1 ￿ ￿)u(y￿)
q￿ + ￿




where n￿ solves ￿0(n)[u(y￿) ￿ c(y￿)] = k.
5 Dynamic Equilibria
We now consider non-stationary equilibria with imperfect credit (recall that perfect credit implies the only
equilibrium is stationary). From (21), with imperfect credit, the price of the liquid asset satis￿es the ￿rst-
order di⁄erence equation













y￿;!￿1 [(qt + ￿)A]
￿
; (27)










and  (n) ￿
￿(n)
n , while !(y) ￿ ￿c(y)+(1￿￿)u(y). The price of the liquid asset at t￿1 equals the discounted
sum of the price plus dividend at t,
qt+￿
1+r , multiplied by a liquidity factor, the term in braces in (26). Any
equilibrium fqtg
+1
t=0 must also satisfy qt ￿ q￿, since the price cannot be less than the fundamental price. The
next lemma shows that we can also restrict attention to bounded sequences.
Lemma 5 A sequence fqtg
1
t=0 that solves (26) satis￿es limt!1 ￿
tqt = 0 i⁄ qt is bounded.
To analyze qt￿1 = ￿(qt), we de￿ne two thresholds. The ￿rst is the price above which households have
enough liquidity to buy y￿, ￿ q =
!(y
￿)














￿ u(y￿) ￿ c(y￿)
= 1 otherwise




, because qt < q implies





exceeds the fundamental price because the asset facilitates DM trade. So the nonlinear
part of ￿(qt) re￿ ects the existence of a liquidity premium or bubble.
Lemma 6 ￿(qt) is continuous. If k ￿ k￿, then ￿(q) =
rq
￿+q
1+r for all q. If k < k￿, then q < ￿ q and the
following is true: ￿(q) =
rq
￿+q
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Figure 5: Left: A ￿
!(y
￿)
q￿+￿; Right: A <
!(y
￿)
q￿+￿ and k > ^ k.
We now dispense with some simple cases. Consider abundant liquidity, A ￿
!(y
￿)
q￿+￿. Then there are two
subcases, k < k￿ and k > k￿. When k < k￿, the phase diagram is as shown in the left panel of Figure 5.
In this case qt￿1 = ￿(qt) is linear with slope 1 + r, so any nonstationary solution to qt￿1 = ￿(qt) grows
asymptotically at rate r, which violates transversality. The unique equilibrium is qt = q￿, the same as with
perfect credit. Next, when k > k￿ ￿rms do not enter irrespective of q, but the phase diagram still looks like
the left panel of Figure 5. These cases with abundant liquid wealth are covered in part (i) of Proposition 7
below.
Now consider the case where liquidity is scarce, A <
!(y
￿)





there are values of q such that ￿rms enter, shown as the nonlinear part of qt￿1 = ￿(qt) in the right panel of
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Figure 6: Left: A <
!(y
￿)





Figure 5, but the unique equilibrium is still qt = q￿ since anything else violates transversality. In contrast,
if the entry cost is su¢ ciently low, k < ~ k, in any equilibrium the DM is active and the price of the liquid
asset is above its fundamental value. Moreover, if ￿ looks like the left panel of Figure 6 ￿i.e. its slope
at the stationary equilibrium is greater than one ￿the equilibrium is unique and it is stationary. When




, there can also be multiple non-stationary equilibria, as
in the right panel of Figure 6. In this case, there are a continuum of trajectories, starting from di⁄erent
q0 between the fundamental price and the higher stationary price, that all converge to an intermediate
stationary equilibrium.
Proposition 7 (i) If A ￿
!(y
￿)
q￿+￿, then qt = q￿ and nt = n solves (14).
(ii) Assume A <
!(y
￿)
q￿+￿. If k > ^ k, then qt = q￿ and nt = 0. If k < ~ k, then qt > q￿ and nt > 0 for all t ￿ 0




, then there are multiple equilibria including (qt;nt) = (q￿;0) for all
t, and a continuum of nonstationary equilibria.
In the equilibria described so far qt varies monotonically over time. There can also be cycles, where qt,
nt, and yt ￿ uctuate over time. We proceed by way of example, using f(y) = y, ￿(n) = 1 ￿ e￿n and
u(y) =
(y + 0:1)1￿￿ ￿ 0:11￿￿
1 ￿ ￿
:
22For these examples, we ￿x r = 0:1, ￿ = 0:1 and ￿ = 0:4, and vary the other parameters. In particular, if the
utility parameter ￿ is large, ￿ bends backward as shown in Figure 7. In this case, an increase in qt+1 has two
e⁄ects: it drives qt up, as in any standard model; and it reduces the liquidity premium (when the asset price
increases, total liquid wealth rises and it becomes worth less at the margin). If ￿ is large the second e⁄ect
dominates, and ￿ slopes downward across the 45o line. If the slope of ￿ is less than 1 in absolute value, there
exists a continuum of q0 in the neighborhood of steady state such that qt and nt converge nonmonotonically
to steady state. Consequently, even when the stationary equilibrium is unique, as in the right panel of Figure
7, we can have indeterminacy of dynamic equilibria, and ￿ uctuations in prices and quantities.
Figure 7: Two-period cycles: ￿ = 2, A = 0:5, k = 0:2.
Moreover, when the slope of ￿ on the 45o line passes ￿1, the system experiences a ￿ ip bifurcation, giving
rise to 2-cycles.10 In the left panel of Figure 7, 2-period cycles are ￿xed points of the second iterate of the
system, qt = ￿2(qt+2). Alternatively, as in the right panel, the cycles can be found at the intersection of
qt = ￿(qt+1) and its inverse. The simple intuition for a 2-cycle is as follows. When q is low, agents anticipate
it will increase and liquid wealth will rise ￿hence, a marginal unit of the asset will have a small liquidity
premium. Conversely, if q is high, agents anticipate it will fall and liquidity will become scarce ￿hence, a
10See Azariadis (1993, p.95-97) for a textbook treatment. Since the mathematics are well known, we do not dwell on technical
details. The contribution here is intended to be our model of an economy where assets have a transactions role. Given the
model, once we derive the relevant di⁄erence equation, the application dynamical system theory is standard. What we think is
novel is the application of these tools in our model of the asset market.
23Figure 8: Multiple stationary equilibria and two-period cycles: ￿ = 3, A = 1:5, k = 20
big liquidity premium. While Figure 7 has a unique stationary equilibrium with a 2-cycle around it, Figure
8 has multiple stationary equilibria with a 2-period cycle around the highest one. In both cases q alternates
between a situation where households are liquidity constrained and one where they are not.
t t q q = +3 t t q q = +1
) ( 1 + G = t t q q ) ( 3
3
+ G = t t q q
Figure 9: Three-period cycle: ￿ = 2:3, A = 0:5, and k = 0:2.
The trajectory shown in Figure 1 in the Introduction, with ￿ uctuating asset prices followed by a crash,
corresponds to an example like the one in Figure 8 with parameter values ￿ = 3, A = 1:5, and k = 20. During
24the expansion phases, the return on the liquid asset is equal to the rate of time preference and households
are not liquidity constrained, but the price cannot keep on increasing, or we would violate transversality. We
again have ￿ uctuations around a high-price stationary equilibrium, but now we crash at some point toward a
lower-price equilibrium. The timing of the crash is indeterminate ￿we can make it happen whenever we like.
All agents in the model know the bubble will burst, and they know exactly when, in this perfect foresight
equilibrium, but there is nothing they can do to either avoid it or pro￿t from it. Moreover, as ￿ increases
further, the system can generate periodic equilibria of higher order, including 3-cycles as shown in Figure 9.
Once 3-cycles exist, then all periodic orbits exist, including 1-cycles, or chaotic dynamics (Azariadis 1993,
p.107). Hence, once the transactions role of assets and liquidity are modeled seriously, prices can display a
wide range of dynamic behavior, even in perfect foresight equilibrium with rational agents.
6 Stochastic Equilibria
So far, we have described deterministic equilibria, where agents have perfect foresight. In this section we
introduce extrinsic uncertainty ￿a sunspot ￿to construct equilibria where the economy ￿ uctuates randomly
between states with di⁄erent asset prices, trade volume and output.11 The sample space of the sunspot
variable s is S = f‘;hg, and s follows a Markov process with ￿ss0 = Pr[st+1 = s0st = s], with s observed by
all agents at the start of each CM. We focus on equilibria where qs and ns are time-invariant functions of s
(i.e., stationary sunspot equilibria). Of course, as usual, there are equilibria where agents ignore s. A proper
sunspot equilibrium requires that prices or allocations are di⁄erent in the two states s = ‘ and s = h.
Following standard reasoning, we can write the household problem as
max
a￿0
f￿qsa + ￿￿(ns)￿fu[y((￿ qs + ￿)a)] ￿ c[y((￿ qs + ￿)a)]g + ￿(￿ qs + ￿)ag; (29)
where ￿ qs =
P
s02S ￿ss0qs0, and the free entry condition as
￿(ns)
ns
(1 ￿ ￿)fu[y((￿ qs + ￿)A)] ￿ c[y((￿ qs + ￿)A)]g ￿ k; (30)
11We argued earlier that it does not matter whether the asset is used in the DM as a means of payment or as collateral, since
all parties are indi⁄erent to whether the buyer repays his debt in the CM or defaults and leaves his collateral. This is clear with
perfect foresight, but in sunspot equilibria the equivalence is more subtle, because the CM value of an asset can depend upon
the realization of the state. Now repayment can be contingent on the state, of course, but suppose for the sake of argument
it is not. This potentially gives a buyer strict incentive to default in some states. Given quasi-linear utility, however, this is
actually immaterial, since default can be taken into account when the loan terms are negotiated.
25with an equality if ns > 0. The expected value of one unit of a before entering the next CM is ￿ qs +￿, where
￿ qs is the expected price conditional on current s. The ￿rst-order condition of the household together with
a = A yield




u0 [y((￿ qs + ￿)A)] ￿ c0 [y((￿ qs + ￿)A)]
(1 ￿ ￿)u0 [y((￿ qs + ￿)A)] + ￿c0 [y((￿ qs + ￿)A)]
￿￿
: (31)
De￿nition 3 A (proper, stationary, two-state) sunspot equilibrium has (qt;nt) = (qs;ns) in state s, satis-
fying (30) and (31), with (q‘;n‘) 6= (qh;nh).
Although other outcomes are possible, for dramatic e⁄ect consider equilibria with n‘ = 0 and nh > 0,
where the DM completely shuts down whenever s = ‘, and reopens whenever ￿animal spirits￿stochastically
switch back to s = h. Note that in any such an equilibrium, q‘ > q￿, so there is a positive liquidity premium
or bubble component to the asset price even when the DM is inactive, because of the expectation that it will
reopen at some random date. We have the following result.12




, if ￿‘h and ￿h‘ are su¢ ciently small there exists a sunspot equilibrium
where 0 = n‘ < nh and q￿ < q‘ < qh.
7 Applications
We consider three applications of our model. First we discuss the provision of liquid assets by the public
sector, and ask whether government should try to eliminate liquidity premia or bubbles. We then study how
the private sector might endogenously provide liquidity for itself. Then we use the model to think about
￿rms undertaking collateralized loans in over-the-counter markets to ￿nance the acquisition of capital or
other intermediate goods.
7.1 Public Liquidity Provision
So far, we have seen that imperfect credit and scarce liquidity can generate various types of endogenous
instability, including periodic, chaotic and stochastic equilibria. Here we investigate the e⁄ects of public
12The methodology for constructing sunspot equilibria is similar Wright (1994) and Ennis (2001a). As in Azariadis and
Guesnerie (1986) or Guesnerie (1986), one could also construct sunspot equilibria from the 2-period cycles in Section 5. One
di⁄erence is that the method here generates sunspot equilibria that are very persistent, while the other method yields equilibria
that are close to 2-cycles and hence not persistent.
26liquidity provision. Suppose the government can issue one-period real bonds backed by its ability to tax:
each bond issued in the CM at t is a claim to 1 unit of the numØraire x in the CM at t + 1. Assume bonds
are recognizable (non-counterfeitable), which means that they can be traded, in the DM. The government
budget constraint is Bt￿1 = qb;tBt + Tt, where Bt is the quantity of bonds issued at t, qb;t the price, and Tt
is a lump-sum tax. The fundamental price of this bonds is q￿
b = ￿.
The household￿ s problem can now be written
max
a￿0;b￿0
f￿r[(qt￿1 ￿ q￿) ￿ (qt ￿ qt￿1)]a ￿ [(1 + r)qb;t￿1 ￿ 1]b + ￿(nt)￿[u(yt) ￿ c(yt)]g;
where yt = y￿ if !(y￿) ￿ (qt + ￿)a + b and !(yt) = (qt + ￿)a + b otherwise. The FOC imply:
r(qt￿1 ￿ q￿) ￿ (qt ￿ qt￿1)
qt + ￿




￿c0(yt) + (1 ￿ ￿)u0(yt)
￿
: (32)
For the liquid asset and bonds to both be held, since they are equally liquid, they must have the same return,
qt+￿
qt￿1 = 1
qb;t￿1. Moreover, the real interest rate
1￿qb;t￿1
qb;t￿1 is less than the discount rate whenever yt < y￿. Using
free-entry condition, welfare in equilibrium is








Thus, welfare at t > 0 is ￿(nt) times the DM surplus ￿[u(yt) ￿ c(yt)], plus the CM output of the trees A￿.
Also, at t = 0 households enjoy an expected surplus of ￿(n0)[u(y0) ￿ (q0 + ￿)￿a;0] and ￿rms earn revenue
￿(n0)[￿c(y0) + (q0 + ￿)￿a;0] + n0f(1).
Proposition 9 Assume that (1 ￿ ￿)[u(y￿) ￿ c(y￿)] > k. The optimal provision of bonds is such that B ￿
!(y￿) ￿ (q￿ + ￿)A. It achieves q = q￿, qb = q￿
b, and y = y￿.
This result says that when there is a shortage of private assets, !(y￿) > (q￿ + ￿)A, government should
supplement the stock of liquidity with enough bonds so that agents can trade y￿ in the DM, which means
they are satiated in liquidity, and we de￿ ate the liquidity premium to 0. Although this policy implies DM
trade is e¢ cient, as suggested by Proposition 6, the measure of ￿rms is generically ine¢ cient. Also note
27that, if policy is not optimal, an increase B does not necessarily reduce q. Figure 10 shows an example
where, in the absence of intervention, there exist one inactive and two active stationary equilibria. Suppose
we introduce some bonds, but the total supply of liquid assets is not su¢ cient to allow agents to trade y￿
in the DM. This eliminates the inactive and the low equilibria, but the high equilibrium remains. So if the
economy is initially at the equilibrium with low q, an increase in liquidity can lead to a larger q.
Figure 10: Phase lines: ￿ = 1:5, b = ￿ = r = 0:1, ￿ = 0:6, A = 0:3, and B 2 f0;0:3g
Also, the result that the provision of liquidity is optimal when agents are satiated, in the sense that they
can trade y￿, is not robust to details of the speci￿cation. In particular, it is sensitive to our choice of DM
pricing mechanism. In the Appendix we show that if we use Walrasian pricing instead of bargaining, it can
be optimal for some parameter values to keep liquidity scarce and accept yt < y￿. This can be the case
because ￿rms entering the DM do not internalize congestion on other ￿rms, so entry can be too high. Policy
can mitigate this by making liquid assets costly to hold, which requires the price to be above its fundamental
value. This cannot happen under bargaining as in our benchmark model, but can under Walrasian pricing.13
Additionally, we can obtain a similar result in a version of the model with bargaining but endogenous entry
of households, instead of ￿rms. (Details are available on request). In this version of the model, if households
have too much bargaining power then it is optimal keep liquidity scarce. More work could be done on these
13For related results showing how optimal policy can depend on the mechanism, see Rocheteau and Wright (2005,2009).
28policy problems, but this would take us away from our main objective here, which is to show how economies
with scarce liquidity can display a wide range of interesting dynamic equilibria.
7.2 Private Liquidity Provision
There can be endogenous mechanisms that produce liquidity when assets are in short supply. To illustrate
this idea, consider the case where stocks st (equity claims on ￿rm revenue) can be authenticated at no cost in
the DM, so that they can also be used to facilitate DM trade (for simplicity here we ignore government bonds).
Then a household with a portfolio (at;st) obtains yt units of DM output, where yt = y￿ if (qt+￿)at+Rtst ￿
















s + ￿(nt)￿[u(yt) ￿ c(yt)]
￿
:






























(1 ￿ ￿)[u(yt) ￿ c(yt)] + f(1)
￿
= kf: (36)
If there is a shortage of liquid assets then yt < y￿ and the real interest rate falls below the rate of time
preference, which tends to increase the number of ￿rms and hence inside liquidity.14 This is a mechanism
for the endogenous private provision of liquidity. An equilibrium is a bounded sequence f(nt;qt)g1
t=0 that
solves (34) and (36). This model is harder to solve, because we can not use (36) to determine nt uniquely
as a function of qt. The measure of participating ￿rms nt a⁄ects pro￿tability not only through trading
probabilities, as in standard search models, but also through the liquidity that these ￿rms provides by their
very existence. Hence we analyze some examples.
14The terminology of inside and outside liquidity is used in Holmstrom and Tirole (2008, p.57), presumably by analogy to
the notions of inside and outside monies.
29We ￿rst characterize equilibria where there is no shortage of liquidity so yt = y￿. Then (34) implies
Rt = ￿
￿1, and the only bounded sequence of asset prices solving
qt+￿
qt￿1 = ￿
￿1 is the stationary solution
qt = q￿. From (36), nt = n￿, so the outcome corresponds to the one with perfect credit. From (35) yt = y￿ if
and only if q￿A+n￿kf ￿ ￿!(y￿), which generalizes the condition in the previous sections to the case where
stocks are liquid.15 Clearly, when stocks are liquid, a liquidity shortage is less likely.
Now consider the case where there is a shortage of liquid wealth and ￿ = 0 (households have no bargaining
power). From (34), assets have no liquidity value since households get no surplus from DM trade. Then
Rt = ￿
￿1 and qt = q￿. If stocks were illiquid, as in the previous section, the number of ￿rms would be





[u(yt) ￿ c(yt)] + f(1)
￿
￿ kf;





. An equilibrium is an nt solving ￿(nt) = 0. As
shown in the Appendix and illustrated in Figure 11, if A is small there is an equilibrium with nt = 0 and an
even number with nt > 0. Across equilibria DM output, the measure of active ￿rms, and the total value of
the stock market are positively related. This multiplicity arises because the creation of a ￿rm has a positive
externality on other ￿rms, since it generates additional liquidity that facilitates DM trade.
Finally, we consider the case where ￿rms have no bargaining power in the DM, ￿ = 1. This illustrates






f(1) ￿ kf : (37)
Under the assumption ￿kf + ￿f(1) < 0, we have q > ￿
r = q￿. For entry to occur the asset price must be
greater than its value in the perfect credit economy, and the real interest must be lower than the rate of






f(1) ￿ kf A + f(1)n
￿￿
: (38)
Thus, y increases with the measure of ￿rms since stocks are part of households￿liquid wealth. From (36),
15For those who know the related literature, this condition encompasses the one in Geromichalos, Licari, and Suarez-Lledo
(2007) for a ￿xed stock of liquid assets and the one in Lagos and Rocheteau (2008) with reproducible liquid assets.









kf = 0: (39)
Provided that ￿f(1)=kf is close 1, there are multiple steady-state equilibria (see Appendix): an inactive
equilibrium with n = 0 and R = ￿
￿1; and an even number of active equilibria with n > 0, where q > q￿ and
R < ￿
￿1. Firms are willing to participate even though they receive no surplus in the DM because the real
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Figure 11: Multiple equilibria with liquid stocks
7.3 Corporate Finance
Consider a reinterpretation of the model where the liquid asset is used to reallocate capital among ￿rms.
Suppose that risk-neutral households only value CM goods, as in standard search models of the labor market.
A unit measure of ￿rms produce the CM good using intermediate goods according to the technology zf(i),
where z 2 fzL;zHg with zL < zH is an idiosyncratic productivity shock. Each ￿rm is endowed with one
unit of the intermediate good in the CM, which fully depreciates in the next DM (one could also at the cost
of simplicity endogeneize ￿rms￿CM investments in intermediate goods). At the beginning of each period,
31a ￿rm draws a realization of z. With probability ￿H, z = zH and with probability ￿L, z = zL. We now
interpret the DM as an over-the-counter market where ￿rms reallocate capital goods. Suppose a ￿rm with
high productivity meets (where we use this term loosely) a ￿rm with low productivity with probability ￿￿L,
and a ￿rm with low productivity meets a ￿rm with high productivity with probability ￿￿H.
Firms are not liquidity constrained in the CM ￿i.e., they can borrow at the interest rate r ￿but in the
DM they can only issue loans secured with liquid assets. De￿ning
u(y) = zH [f(1 + y) ￿ f(1)]
c(y) = zL [f(1) ￿ f(1 ￿ y)];
the e¢ cient transfer of capital goods leads to zHf0(1 + y￿) = zLf0(1 ￿ y￿). Using the same reasoning as







zHf0(1 + yt) ￿ zLf0(1 ￿ yt)




yt = y￿ if (qt + ￿)A ￿ ￿zL [f(1) ￿ f(1 ￿ y￿)] + (1 ￿ ￿)zH [f(1 + y￿) ￿ f(1)]
(qt + ￿)A = ￿zL [f(1) ￿ f(1 ￿ yt)] + (1 ￿ ￿)zH [f(1 + yt) ￿ f(1)] otherwise.
Now all of the earlier results go through. Much more can be done with this model in terms of substantive
applications, but we leave that to future work.
8 Conclusion
We studied the dynamics of asset markets in economies where frictions make credit di¢ cult, which makes
liquidity essential, and where market participation is costly. One message is that economies where liquidity
plays a role are inherently unstable. There can be multiple steady-state equilibria that di⁄er in terms of asset
prices, participation, and stock market capitalization. Markets can break down and liquidity premia vanish
because of self-ful￿lling beliefs. The model can generate periodic equilibria, with ￿ uctuating prices and
allocations, even though fundamentals are constant. We can also generate stochastic crashes and recoveries
32driven by extrinsic uncertainty (sunspots). Some of the equilibria are reminiscent of bubbles: a runup
followed by a collapse in asset prices that cannot be explained by fundamentals. These results are consistent
with rationality on the part of the agents in the model, who have perfect foresight or rational expectations.
In terms of policy, the government can in principle supply enough liquidity to satiate households and thus
eliminate instability; depending on the search frictions, this might or might not be optimal.
We close by saying that we do not want any particular example in this paper to be considered the
de￿nitive model of an asset market. The paper should be interpreted as an illustration of the power and
￿ exibility of theories that take seriously the transactions role of assets ￿and by this we mean all assets,
not merely ￿at currency. Our conclusion is that much can be learned once it is understood that there are
important complementarities between asset pricing, in general, and monetary theory.
33Appendix A. Proofs
Proof of Lemma 2 The necessity and su¢ ciency of the transversality condition (20) is proved in Appendix
B. The household￿ s objective function in (19) is denoted
￿t(a) ￿ ￿(r(qt￿1 ￿ q￿) ￿ (qt ￿ qt￿1))a + ￿(nt)￿fu[y((qt + ￿)a)] ￿ c[y((qt + ￿)a)]g;
where y((qt+￿)a) = y￿ if (qt+￿)a ￿ (1￿￿)u(y￿)+￿c(y￿) and y((qt+￿)a) is the solution to (17) otherwise.
This objective function is concave. To see this, di⁄erentiate ￿t to obtain
￿0
t(a) = ￿(r(qt￿1 ￿ q￿) ￿ (qt ￿ qt￿1)) + ￿(nt)￿
￿
u0(y) ￿ c0(y)
￿c0(y) + (1 ￿ ￿)u0(y)
￿
(qt + ￿):













qt+￿ , y((qt +￿)a) = y￿ and ￿0(a) = ￿(r(qt￿1 ￿ q￿) ￿ (qt ￿ qt￿1)). We distinguish three
cases:




qt+￿ , since otherwise at￿0
t(at) < 0 and the ￿rst-order




qt+￿ ] ￿t(a) is continuous and strictly concave,
so (19) has a unique solution given by (21).






(iii) If r(qt￿1 ￿ q￿) < qt ￿ qt￿1, then the solution to (19) is unbounded.










n is decreasing in n with
￿(0)
0 = 1 and limn!1
￿(n)
n = 0, a solution n > 0 to (40) exists, and is
unique, i⁄ k
(1￿￿)[u(y)￿c(y)] < 1, which gives (24). If k
(1￿￿)[u(y)￿c(y)] ￿ 1, then
￿(0)
0 (1￿￿)[u(y) ￿ c(y)]￿k ￿ 0
and n = 0. Di⁄erentiating (40) we obtain
n0(q) =













￿(n) < 1 from the strict concavity of ￿(n) and the assumption ￿(0) = 0. From (17), y < y￿ and
@y
@q = A
￿c0(y)+(1￿￿)u0(y) > 0 if (q + ￿)A < !(y￿) and y = y￿ and
@y
@q = 0 if (q + ￿)A > !(y￿). Consequently,
n0(q) > 0 if (q + ￿)A < !(y￿) and n0(q) = 0 if (q + ￿)A ￿ !(y￿).






u0 [y((q + ￿)A)] ￿ c0 [y((q + ￿)A)]
￿c0 [y((q + ￿)A)] + (1 ￿ ￿)u0 [y((q + ￿)A)]
￿
:




￿c0(y)+(1￿￿)u0(y) is decreasing in y and y(￿) is
decreasing in (q +￿)A, ￿0(q;n) > 0, ￿(q￿;n) ￿ 0 and ￿(1) = r. Hence, there is a unique q 2 [q￿;+1) such
that ￿(q;n) = 0. We distinguish two cases:
(i) If (q￿ +￿)A ￿ !(y￿), then (15)-(16) imply y((q￿ +￿)A) = y￿ and ￿(q￿;n) = 0. So q(n) = q￿ for all n.
(ii) If (q￿ + ￿)A < !(y￿), then y((q￿ + ￿)A) < y￿ and ￿(q￿;n) < 0 for all n > 0. Then the solution to





u0 [y((q + ￿)A)] ￿ c0 [y((q + ￿)A)]
￿c0 [y((q + ￿)A)] + (1 ￿ ￿)u0 [y((q + ￿)A)]
￿
> 0:
As n ! 0, ￿(n) ! 0, and ￿(q;n) converges uniformly to
r(q￿q
￿)
q+￿ . Hence limn!0 q(n) = q￿. As n ! 1,





u0 [y((q + ￿)A)] ￿ c0 [y((q + ￿)A)]
￿c0 [y((q + ￿)A)] + (1 ￿ ￿)u0 [y((q + ￿)A)]
￿
= 0:





q￿+￿ . For all q ￿ q￿, A(q + ￿) ￿ A(q￿ + ￿) ￿ ￿c(y￿) + (1 ￿ ￿)u(y￿). Then n solves











u0 [y((q + ￿)A)] ￿ c0 [y((q + ￿)A)]
￿c0 [y((q + ￿)A)] + (1 ￿ ￿)u0 [y((q + ￿)A)]
￿
;











such that ￿(q;k) = 0.
Next, we introduce the ^ k that allows us to distinguish di⁄erent con￿gurations for the equilibrium set.
De￿ne K = fk : 9q > q￿ st￿(q;k) < 0g. From (23), n(q;k) is decreasing in k. Hence, ￿(q;k) is
increasing in k. So if k 2 K, then any k0 < k is in K; if k = 2 K, then any k0 > k is not in K. Moreover,
K is open in R+ since k 2 K implies k
0
> k is in K provided that it is close to k. So K = [0;^ k) for




. If k = k￿, then n(q;k) = 0 and ￿(q;k) =
r(q￿q
￿)
q+￿ for all q ￿ q￿.
Hence, k￿ = 2 K. For all k < ~ k and all q ￿ q￿, n(q;k) > 0 and ￿(q￿;k) < 0. Consequently, for all k < ~ k,
k 2 K, and by taking the limit when k approaches ~ k, ~ k ￿ ^ k.
35We distinguish three subcases:
Consider the case k < ~ k. Suppose there is an equilibrium with n = 0. Then, from (21), q = q￿. But
k < ~ k implies k < (1 ￿ ￿)fu[y [(q￿ + ￿)A]] ￿ c[y [(q￿ + ￿)A]]g and hence, from Lemma 3, n > 0, a
contradiction. So any equilibrium is such that n > 0. Moreover, ￿(q￿;k) < 0. Hence, the solution to
￿(q;k) = 0 is such that q > q￿.




. First, we establish that (n;q) = (0;q￿) is an equilibrium. If
k > ~ k = (1 ￿ ￿)fu[y [(q￿ + ￿)A]] ￿ c[y [(q￿ + ￿)A]]g;
then from (23) n(q￿;k) = 0 and ￿(q￿;k) = 0. So (n;q) = (0;q￿) is an equilibrium. Second, we establish
that generically there exist an even number of steady-state equilibria with n > 0 and q > q￿. There






















q+￿ > 0. If k < ^ k, then k 2 K and there is a q > q￿ such that ￿(q;k) < 0. For all
q ￿ ￿ q ￿
!(y
￿)
A ￿ ￿ > q￿, y [(q + ￿)A] = y￿ and ￿(q;k) ￿
r(q￿q
￿)
q+￿ > 0. Since ￿ is continuous in q, there




such that ￿(q;k) = 0. Moreover, since q > q, n(q;k) > 0.
Consider the case k > ^ k. If k > ^ k, then k = 2 K and there is no q > q￿ such that ￿(q;k) < 0. Suppose
there is a q > q￿ such that ￿(q;k) = 0, which requires n(q;k) > 0. For all k0 2 (^ k;k), n(q;k0) > n(q;k)
and ￿(q;k0) < ￿(q;k) = 0. So, (^ k;k) ￿ K. A contradiction. So the only equilibrium is (n;q) = (0;q￿).
Su¢ cient conditions for ~ k < ^ k.











u0 [y((q + ￿)A)] ￿ c0 [y((q + ￿)A)]
￿c0 [y((q + ￿)A)] + (1 ￿ ￿)u0 [y((q + ￿)A)]
￿
:
Notice that n(q￿;~ k) = 0 implies ￿(q￿;~ k) = 0. Consequently, a su¢ cient condition for ~ k 2 K is C0
1(q￿) <
C0
2(q￿). It can be checked that C0
1(q￿) = r




u0 [y((q￿ + ￿)A)] ￿ c0 [y((q￿ + ￿)A)]



























￿￿00(0)fu[y((q￿ + ￿)A)] ￿ c[y((q￿ + ￿)A)]g
;






2 when n approaches 0 (since n(q￿;~ k) = 0). As A approaches
0,
u0 [y((q￿ + ￿)A)] ￿ c0 [y((q￿ + ￿)A)]





where we used that c0(0) = 0, and










￿￿00(0)(q￿+￿). So, as A approaches 0, C0
1(q￿) <
C0
2(q￿) is equivalent to r < ￿
1￿￿
2
￿￿00(0). By the continuity of C0








q￿+￿ such that for all A < ￿ A, ~ k < ^ k.
Proof of Proposition 4
(i) From Proposition 3, if A ￿
!(y
￿)




























(ii) From the proof of Proposition 3, q is the solution to ￿(q;k;A) = 0. If k < ^ k, an active equilibrium
exists and it is such that q > q￿, since A <
!(y
￿)
q￿+￿. It can be checked that ￿ is increasing in A and k.
Moreover, at the equilibrium with the highest q, the curve representing ￿(q;k;A) as a function of q
intersects the horizontal axis from below, i.e., ￿q = @￿
@q > 0. So
@q
@k = ￿￿k




Since ￿a = A, V = ￿(n). From (23), it is immediate that n increases with q and decreases with k


















, there is an
equilibrium with n = 0 and q = q￿. Household welfare is at a minimum and equal to V = A￿
1￿￿. There are
also an even number of active equilibria with n > 0 and q > q￿. From (17) and (23),





(1 ￿ ￿)[u(y) ￿ c(y)]
:
The stationary equilibrium with higher q is associated with higher y, higher n, and, from (25), higher welfare.


















￿(nt)[u(yt) ￿ c(yt)] + ntf(1) + A￿ ￿ nt+1kf￿
;
where from the ￿rst line to the second line we have used the expression for the ￿rm￿ s pro￿ts in (22). The
￿rst-order condition with respect to yt gives u0(yt) = c0(yt), i.e., yt = y￿. The ￿rst-order condition with
respect to nt gives ￿0(nt)[u(y￿) ￿ c(y￿)] ￿ kf=￿ ￿ f(1) = k, or nt = n￿. From Proposition 3, yt = y￿ if and
only if A ￿
!(y
￿)
q￿+￿. From (23), nt = n￿ if and only if
￿(n
￿)
n￿ (1 ￿ ￿) = ￿0(n￿).
Proof of Lemma 5 If fqtg1
t=0 is bounded, it is immediate that the transversality condition holds. Next,
we show that any unbounded sequence fqtg1
t=0 violates limt!1 ￿
tqt = 0. The function ￿(q) is continuous
and over the interval [q￿; ￿ q] it reaches a maximum qmax, where (￿ q + ￿)A = !(y￿). For all qt+1 ￿ ￿ q,
￿(qt+1) = ￿(qt+1 + ￿). If fqtg1
t=0 is unbounded, there is a T such that for all t ￿ T, qt > max(q￿;qmax)
and qt = ￿(qt+1 + ￿). The solution to this di⁄erence equation is qT+t = (qT ￿ q￿)(1 + r)t + q￿. Hence,
limt!1 ￿
tqT+t = qT ￿ q￿ > 0.
Proof of Lemma 6. The continuity of the function ￿ comes from the continuity of u(y), c(y), and ￿(n),
and hence the continuity of !(y) and  (n).





= 1 for all yt ￿ y￿ and, from (28),
nt = 0 since
￿(0)









A ￿ ￿ < ￿ q =
!(y
￿)





< y￿ and !0 > 0. For all q ￿ q,
nt = 0 and, from (26), ￿(qt) =
rq
￿+qt
1+r . For all q ￿ ￿ q, yt = y￿ and, from (26), ￿(qt) =
rq
￿+qt









￿c0(yt) + (1 ￿ ￿)u0(yt)
￿
> 0:




38Proof of Proposition 7.
(i) The condition A ￿
!(y
￿)
q￿+￿ is equivalent to q￿ ￿ ￿ q =
!(y
￿)




q ￿ q￿. Any solution to qt￿1 = ￿(qt) =
rq
￿+qt
1+r is of the form
qt = C(1 + r)t + q￿;
where C ￿ 0. The transversality condition, limt!1
qt
(1+r)t = 0, implies C = 0 and hence qt = q￿. From
(15)-(16), (q￿ + ￿)A ￿ !(y￿), yt = y￿. Given qt = q￿ and yt = y￿, nt is determined by (28).
(ii) Suppose ￿rst that k ￿ k￿ = (1￿￿)[u(y￿) ￿ c(y￿)]. From (28), nt = 0. Consequently, qt￿1 =
qt+￿
1+r for all
qt ￿ q￿, and the only solution that satis￿es the transversality condition, limt!1
qt
(1+r)t = 0, is qt = q￿.
Assume next that A <
!(y
￿)
q￿+￿ and k > ^ k. From the proof of Proposition 3, ￿(q;k) =
(1+r)[q￿￿(q)]
q+￿ . We
established that if A <
!(y
￿)
q￿+￿ and k > ^ k, then ￿(q￿;k) = 0 and ￿(q;k) > 0 for all q > q￿. Hence,
q￿ = ￿(q￿) and qt￿1 = ￿(qt) < qt for all qt > q￿. If q0 6= q￿, then fqtg1
t=0 is monotone increasing
and unbounded, which from Lemma 5 cannot be an equilibrium. (If the sequence has a ￿nite limit,
q1 > q￿, then by the continuity of ￿ this limit satis￿es q1 = ￿(q1), which is a contradiction.) Hence,
the only admissible trajectory is qt = q￿. Since ^ k ￿ ~ k = (1 ￿ ￿)fu[y [(q￿ + ￿)A]] ￿ c[y [(q￿ + ￿)A]]g,
then nt = 0.
Consider next the case k < ~ k. Let ￿ n denote the solution to
￿(￿ n)
￿ n
(1 ￿ ￿)[u(￿ y) ￿ c(￿ y)] = k;





1 + ￿(￿ n)￿
￿
u0(￿ y) ￿ c0(￿ y)
￿c0(￿ y) + (1 ￿ ￿)u0(￿ y)
￿￿
> q￿;





1+r = q￿. Consequently, for all qt ￿ q￿, qt￿1 > q￿, which implies
that qt = q￿ is not part of an equilibrium. Any trajectory is such that qt > q￿ for all t.




. The condition k > ~ k is equivalent to (1 ￿ ￿)￿[y (A(q￿ + ￿))] < k, and
hence q￿ < q . Hence, from Lemma 6, ￿(q￿) = q￿ and (qt;nt) = (q￿;0) is an equilibrium. From




, then there are an even number of active steady-state equilibria. We





, qt = ￿(qt+1) =
rq
￿+qt+1
1+r < qt+1. Consequently, ￿ is located above the 45o line in






















￿0(qL) 2 (0;1), then the linearized system qt+1 = qL +
qt￿qL
￿0(qL) admits a continuum of solutions
corresponding to di⁄erent initial conditions that converge to qL. If ￿0(qL) = 1, then the phase line is
tangent to the 45o line. It can be checked on a phase diagram that all trajectories such that q0 2 (q￿;qL)
converge to qL.





From (31), the price in the high state satis￿es




u0 [y((￿ qh + ￿)A)] ￿ c0 [y((￿ qh + ￿)A)]
(1 ￿ ￿)u0 [y((￿ qh + ￿)A)] + ￿c0 [y((￿ qh + ￿)A)]
￿￿
; (42)
where ￿ qh =
(r+￿‘h￿r￿h‘)qh+￿h‘￿
r+￿‘h . De￿ne




u0 [y((￿ qh + ￿)A)] ￿ c0 [y((￿ qh + ￿)A)]
(1 ￿ ￿)u0 [y((￿ qh + ￿)A)] + ￿c0 [y((￿ qh + ￿)A)]
￿￿
;
where nh is an implicit function of qh and k de￿ned by (30). The price qh is part of an equilibrium if




then there is a qh > q￿ such that ￿(qh;k;0;￿‘h) = 0.
By the continuity of ￿ and the Implicit Function Theorem, for ￿h‘ su¢ ciently small, there is a qh > q￿ such
that ￿(qh;k;￿h‘;￿‘h) = 0. For n‘ = 0, we need to check that
(1 ￿ ￿)fu[y((￿ q‘ + ￿)A)] ￿ c[y((￿ q‘ + ￿)A)]g ￿ k:
From (41), as ￿‘h tends to 0, ￿ q‘ approaches q‘ and q‘ approaches q￿. Since k > ~ k,
(1 ￿ ￿)fu[y((q￿ + ￿)A)] ￿ c[y((q￿ + ￿)A)]g < k:
Hence, for ￿‘h su¢ ciently close to 0, n‘ = 0.






￿(nt)[u(yt) ￿ (qt + ￿)￿a;t] + nt￿t ￿ nt+1kf + A￿
￿




t￿(nt)[u(yt) ￿ (qt + ￿)￿a;t] +
A￿
1 ￿ ￿








40where from the to the second line we used ￿kf+￿￿t = 0 and the transversality condition, and from the second
to the third we use u(yt)￿(qt+￿)￿a;t = ￿[u(yt) ￿ c(yt)] and n0￿0 = ￿(n0)[￿c(y0) + (q0 + ￿)￿a;0]+n0f(1).
Assuming nt < 0, it solves
￿(nt)
nt
(1 ￿ ￿)[u(yt) ￿ c(yt)] = k:
Then nt is maximum when u(yt) ￿ c(yt) is maximized, at yt = y￿. Consequently, the ￿rst and third terms
on the right side of (43) are maximum when yt = y￿ for all t ￿ 0. From (32), yt = y￿ implies
qt ￿ (1 + r)qt￿1 + rq￿ = 0;
(1 + r)qb;t￿1 ￿ 1 = 0:
The solution to the second equation is qb;t = q￿
b = ￿ for all t ￿ 0. The solution to the ￿rst equation that
satis￿es transversality is qt = q￿. The condition yt = y￿ requires (q￿ + ￿)A + B ￿ !(y￿).
Appendix B. Transversality




Clearly we can set xt = x￿ and focus on other choices. The household chooses an asset plan to maximize
lifetime expected utility. An asset plan speci￿es a portfolio of assets for all (stochastic trading) histories in
the DM. Thus, a trading shock is represented by a binary variable ￿t 2 f0;1g where ￿t = 1 if the household
is matched in the DM at t and ￿t = 0 otherwise. A partial history is ￿t = (￿0;￿1;:::;￿t) 2 f0;1g
t+1. The












An asset plan is an initial (a0;s0) 2 R2+ and a sequence of functions fat;stg1
t=1 mapping partial history
￿t￿1 into a portfolio, at : f0;1gt ! R+ and st : f0;1gt ! R+, for all t ￿ 1.





t f￿t fu[y((qt + ￿)at)] ￿ (qt + ￿)￿a((qt + ￿)at)g (44)
+(qt + ￿)at ￿ qtat+1 + Rtst ￿ st+1g:
Thus, if the household is matched in period t, yt is consumed, in the DM in exchange for ￿a units of the
asset, where y and ￿a are functions of liquid wealth. In the CM the household enjoys ￿at+Rtst and supplies
41qt(at+1 ￿ at) + st+1 units of labor. The expectation in (44) is taken with respect to the random trading
histories, ￿t.
From the proportional bargaining solution,
u[y((qt + ￿)at)] ￿ (qt + ￿)￿a((qt + ￿)at) = ￿￿[y((qt + ￿)at)];
where ￿(y) = u(y) ￿ c(y). Hence, utility from t = 0 to t = T can be written




t f￿t￿￿[y((qt + ￿)at)] + (qt + ￿)at ￿ qtat+1 + Rtst ￿ st+1g: (45)
Rearrange terms in (45) as:









T (sT+1 + qTaT+1)
i
:




= E￿(nt)￿￿[y((qt + ￿)at)];

























t [U(at;qt;qt￿1;nt) ￿ (1 + r ￿ Rt)st] ￿ E
h
￿




U(at;qt;qt￿1;nt) = ￿(nt)￿￿[y((qt + ￿)at)] ￿ [(1 + r)qt￿1 ￿ (qt + ￿)]at:
The di¢ culty when evaluating asset plans is that limT!1 UT might not exist for all feasible plans. To
circumvent this problem, we use the catching-up criterion of Brock (1970) and Seierstad and Sydsaeter (1987,
p.232), according to which a plan (at;st) catches up to a plan (~ at; ~ st) if
limT!1 [UT(at;st) ￿ UT(~ at; ~ st)] ￿ 0:
42A plan is optimal if it catches up to any other plan with the same initial conditions, (a0;s0).
First, any candidate for an optimal plan is such that at(￿t￿1) = a￿





U(a;qt;qt￿1;nt) for all t ￿ 1;
where a￿
t is independent of the history ￿t￿1. The proof is by contradiction. Suppose that there is some j ￿ 1
such that aj 6= a￿
j. Then, one can construct an alternative plan, (^ at; ^ st), such that (^ at; ^ st) = (at;st) for all
t 6= j and (^ a￿; ^ s￿) = (a￿
j;sj). Then,
UT(fat;stg) ￿ UT(f^ at; ^ stg) = E￿
￿ [U(at;qt;qt￿1;nt) ￿ U(a￿
t;qt;qt￿1;nt)] < 0; for all T ￿ j;
and hence (at;st) is not catching up to (^ at; ^ st). This establishes that a solution to the sequence problem is a
solution to (19). By a similar reasoning, in any equilibrium, ￿Rt ￿ 1 and st = s￿
t where (1 + r ￿ Rt)s￿
t = 0.




t=0 by a factor 1 ￿ " 2 (0;1) (except the initial asset



























@at = 0 if a￿
t 6= 0. Consequently, a necessary condition for










(Otherwise, for all T > 0, there is a ^ T ￿ T and a " > 0 such that D ^ T(") < 0, i.e., U ^ T(fa￿
t;s￿
tg) ￿ U ^ T(f(1 ￿
")a￿
t;(1 ￿ ")s￿















T+1) = 0: (46)
This leads to limT!1 ￿
Ts￿
T+1 = 0 and limT!1 ￿
TqTa￿
T+1 = 0.
To show su¢ ciency, notice that for any plan, fat;stg with initial conditions (a0;s0)













where the right side is the household￿ s expected lifetime utility under the plan (a￿
t;s￿
t) if (46) holds.
Appendix C. Generalized Nash Bargaining
In the text we used proportional bargaining. Here we show the main insights are preserved using the




￿ [￿ ￿ c(y)]
1￿￿ ;
where ! represents the household￿ s liquid wealth. If ￿ ￿ ! does not bind, then y = y￿ and ￿ = ￿c(y￿)+(1￿
￿)u(y￿). If ￿ ￿ ! binds, the households spends all its wealth and y solves
(qt + ￿)at = !(yt) =
￿u0(yt)c(yt) + (1 ￿ ￿)c0(yt)u(yt)
￿u0(yt) + (1 ￿ ￿)c0(yt)
: (47)




￿(r(qt￿1 ￿ q￿) ￿ (qt ￿ qt￿1))
!(yt)
qt + ￿
+ ￿(nt)[u(yt) ￿ !(yt)]
￿
:
The objective function is continuous in yt and it is maximized over a compact set. Hence, it has a
solution. If the cost of holding assets is zero r(qt￿1 ￿ q￿) = qt ￿ qt￿1, and the DM is active nt > 0, the
household purchases ~ y so that u0 (~ y) = !0(~ y). If ￿ < 1 then ~ y < y￿, and the household has no incentive to
accumulate more wealth than !(~ y). To see this, notice that u0(y￿) ￿ !0(y￿) < 0. In that case, as in Lagos
and Rocheteau (2008) we let households bring only a fraction of their assets to the DM. They choose to do
so if (qt + ￿)at > !(~ y). If it is costly to hold assets, r(qt￿1 ￿ q￿) > qt ￿ qt￿1, households do not hold more
assets than they intend to spend in the DM. The solution, assuming interiority, is given by the ￿rst-order
condition












!0(yt) is decreasing, the solution to the household￿ s problem is obviously unique. Even if
u
0(yt)
!0(yt) is not decreasing, a version of the argument in Wright (2010) can be used to establish uniqueness.
If nt > 0, market clearing implies




￿ A if r(qt￿1 ￿ q￿) = qt ￿ qt￿1; (50)
44where at represents the household￿ s asset holdings brought into the DM. Finally,




[!(yt) ￿ c(yt)] ￿ k; =if nt > 0: (52)
An equilibrium is list fytg, fatg, fntg and fqtg solving (47)-(52).
Consider active stationary equilibria. Consider ￿rst equilibria where qt = qt￿1 = q = q￿. From market
clearing, a =
!(~ y)
q￿+￿ ￿ A and y = ~ y. The measure of ￿rms solves
￿(n)
n
[!(~ y) ￿ c(~ y)] = k:
The measure of participating ￿rms is positive if !(~ y) ￿ c(~ y) > k.





u0 ￿ !￿1 [(q + ￿)A]
!0 ￿ !￿1 [(q + ￿)A]
￿ 1
￿
; if (q￿ + ￿)A < !(~ y).




(q + ￿)A ￿ c ￿ !￿1 [(q + ￿)A]
￿
= k if (q + ￿)A ￿ ￿c(y￿) + (1 ￿ ￿)u(y￿);
￿(n)
n
(1 ￿ ￿)[u(y￿) ￿ c(y￿)] = k if (q + ￿)A ￿ ￿c(y￿) + (1 ￿ ￿)u(y￿):
De￿ne
~ k = (q￿ + ￿)A ￿ c ￿ !￿1 [(q￿ + ￿)A];
k￿ = !(~ y) ￿ c(~ y):
Following the proof of Proposition 3, we have:
Proposition 10 (i) If A ￿
!(~ y)
q￿+￿ and k < k￿, then there is a unique active stationary equilibrium and it





!(~ y) ￿ c(~ y)
:
(ii) If A <
!(~ y)




such that: if k < ~ k, then all active stationary equilibria are




, then there is an even number of active stationary equilibria; if k > ^ k,
then there is no active stationary equilibrium.
45Consider non-stationary equilibria. From (48), q follows










where yt = ~ y if (qt + ￿)A ￿ !(~ y) and yt = !￿1 ((qt + ￿)A) otherwise. Then nt solves










with  (n) =
￿(n)
n . This system is qualitatively similar to the one in the paper.
Appendix D. Public Liquidity Provision under Walrasian Pricing
Suppose that the DM is a Walrasian market where the price of the liquid asset in terms of DM output
is pt and the price of bonds is pb;t. Assume that agents￿ability to trade in this market is limited due to
congestion e⁄ects: a household is able to trade with probability ￿(nt) while a participating ￿rm is able trade
with probability
￿(nt)
nt .16 Note that entry by ￿rms in this setup means entry into the group trying to get
into the Walrasian market, but of these only a fraction
￿(nt)
nt succeed.





[(qt + ￿)￿a;t + ￿b;t ￿ c(pt￿a;t + pb;t￿b;t)] ￿ k; = if nt > 0, (53)
where ￿a;t and ￿b;t are the quantities of assets and bonds obtained by ￿rms trading in the DM. The price




Similarly, a representative household who trades in the DM solves
max
￿a;t￿A;￿b;t￿B
[u(pt￿a;t + pb;t￿b;t) ￿ (qt + ￿)￿a;t ￿ ￿b;t]:
It can easily be checked that if (qt + ￿)A + Bt ￿ y￿c0(y￿) then yt = y￿, and (qt + ￿)A + Bt = ytc0(yt)
otherwise. The asset price satis￿es (32) with ￿ = 1, since under Walrasian pricing households extract the
whole DM marginal surplus. Household welfare is then








Consider a planner choosing fnt;ytg1
t=1 subject to (53) (we ignore the initial choice of y0, which should be
set to y￿ if n0 is taken as given). From the allocation fnt;ytg1
t=1 one can back out asset prices fqt;qb;tg1
t=0 from
16A detailed version of this model with ￿at money is presented in Rocheteau and Wright (2005, Section 4). The assumption
that not all agents get into the night market is merely a convenient way to introduce search frictions into an otherwise Walrasian
model, and can be thought of as a generalized version of Lucas and Prescott (1974) search model.
46(32) with ￿ = 1. If yt = y￿, the supply of liquidity must be such that (qt+￿)A+Bt ￿ y￿c0(y￿). The planner
problem is essentially static. Assuming an interior solution, it maximizes ^ Wt = ￿(nt)[u(yt) ￿ c(yt)] ￿ knt










So if the ￿rm￿ s share is less than its contribution to the matching process, it is optimal to keep liquidity
scarce, (qt +￿)A+Bt < c0(y￿)y￿, which implies yt < y￿. In this case, ￿rms do not internalize the congestion
they impose on other ￿rms in the market, so the number of entrants is too high. Policy can mitigate this
e⁄ect by making liquid assets costly to hold, which requires the asset price to be above its fundamental value.
Appendix E. Private Provision of Liquidity





[u(y) ￿ c(y)] + f(1)
￿
￿ kf;





. As n ! 0, ￿(n) ! ￿
￿
u(y) ￿ c(y) + f(1)
￿
￿ kf,
where !(y) = ￿
￿1q￿A. As n ! 1, ￿(n) ! ￿f(1)￿kf < 0. Consequently, if ￿
￿
u(y) ￿ c(y) + f(1)
￿
￿kf < 0,
which is true if A is small, whenever there is a positive solution to ￿(n) = 0 there are multiple solutions: an
equilibrium with n = 0 and an even number with n > 0.

















f(1) ￿ kf A + f(1)n
￿￿
:
If n = 0 then ￿(n) = 1￿￿
f(1)
kf > 0 and if n = 1 then y = y￿ and ￿(n) = 1￿￿
f(1)
kf > 0. If
￿f(1)
f(1)￿kf A < c(y￿)
and n 2 (0;1) then ￿(n) < 1 ￿ ￿
f(1)
kf . So if ￿f(1)=kf is su¢ ciently close 1, there are multiple steady-state
equilibria. There is an inactive equilibrium with n = 0 and R = ￿
￿1. There are also an even number of
active equilibria where q > q￿ and R < ￿
￿1.
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